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Economists distrust constitutions which rely on trust towards the citi-
zens. Rather, they favour strict over lenient public laws, because they
prevent people from behaving in an opportunistic and exploitative way.
The view that human beings act as knaves, if given the opportunity,
forms the basis of Constitutional Economics (in particluar Brennan
and Buchanan 1983). It is also reflected in the works of David Hume
and John Stuart Mill :
‘In contriving any system of government, and fixing the several
checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought to be sup-
posed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than
private interest’. (David Hume, ‘Of independency of parliament’,
Essays. Moral, Political and Literary, Vol. 1, London, University
Press 1963, pp. 117-118);
‘The very principle of constitutional government requires it to be as-
sumed that political power will be abused to promote the particular
purposes of the holder, not because it always is so, but because
such is the natural tendency of things to guard against which is the
especial use of free institutions.’ (John Stuart Mill, ‘Considerations
∗ Address : Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Blu¨mlisalpstr. 10, 8006 Zu¨rich.
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on representative government’. Essays on Politics and Society, vol.
19 of the Collected Works, p. 505).
Two distinct reasons are normally advanced in favour of strict
constitutions. First, people are knaves if not constrained; second, a
realistic model of (average) human behaviour is not a reasonable basis
for normative institutional design because the harm caused by mo-
vements away from the ideal is disproportionally large (convexity as-
sumption). Rather, the worst-case scenario must be considered and
society’s laws must be so strict that they prevent such malevolent be-
haviour.
This paper wants to draw attention to a crucial aspect disregar-
ded by such arguments : A constitution designed for knaves tends to
crowd out civic virtues, and as a result the constitution is less observed.
The effort to guard the constitution against exploitation may thus lead
to a perverse result. By preparing for the worst case, and not taking
into account average citizen behaviour, such constitutions may destroy
the positive attitude of citizens towards the state. However, civic virtue
can not be spared when it comes to citizenship behaviour. Tax com-
pliance, for example, can not solely be explained by citizens rationally
taking into account the expected probability of being punished. Rather,
tax compliance depends strongly on intrinsic motivation to pay one’s
taxes, i.e. on tax morale. A constitution, and more generally public laws
and regulations, while checking against knaves to some extent, should
therefore also support civic virtues. We present empirical evidence that
constitutions allowing for active citizen participation via popular refe-
renda and initiatives in fact lead to higher civic virtue in the form of
tax compliance. Trusting constitutions are an important way of econo-
mizing on civic virtues.
‘Trusting constitutions’ is also relevant in another aspect. The
economic approach to constitutions can provide valuable insights on
how public laws affect social issues. We show empirically that different
constitutional designs have an impact on the happiness of the respec-
tive citizens. Important social questions can be dealt with by focusing
on the constitutional level, and the basic claim of constitutional eco-
nomics that institutions matter should therefore be emphazised.
Section II expounds the theory of crowding-out civic virtue and
applies the concept to the constitution and public rules in general,
discussing the relevant conditions and drawing the consequences for
legal design. Empirical evidence supporting the effect of the type of
legal structure on civic virtues, in particular on tax morale, is presen-
ted in section III. Section IV introduces the comparative institutional
approach to happiness and presents evidence that constitutional eco-
nomics can provide additional insights on what makes people happy.
Concluding remarks are offered in section V.
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2 Crowding Theory and Constitutional Design
Crowding-out civic virtue, or more generally, intrinsic motivation
echoes the well-known concern by Titmuss (1970) who claims that
an inadequate public policy (in his case material rewards) destroys the
moral incentives to donate voluntarily. Also many scholars outside eco-
nomics have been seriously concerned with the general tendency that
external interventions in the form of regulations or the introduction
of monetary rewards may drive out civic virtues. Thus Goodin (1980)
recognizes governments using both material and moral incentives to
the same end, destroy the ‘purity and seriousness of moral incentives’
while individuals will simply remove those moral considerations from
their decision calculus. According to Elster (1989 : 180) it follows that,
‘If people feel that they are taken advantage of, why should they not
rip off the system in return ? By contrast, political systems that leave
more decisions to the individual can both economize on information
and generate more trust.’
Our knowledge of the conditions under which civic virtues and
other moral motivations are undermined has much progressed recent-
ly. There now exists a well-defined Crowding Theory derived from so-
cial psychology and introduced into economics (Frey 1997b) which is
much more differentiated than the hunch expressed by the above au-
thors. Social psychologists have analyzed and empirically measured
the ‘hidden cost of reward’ (Lepper and Greene, 1978; Deci and Ryan,
1985) which appear when an external intervention (a reward) reduces
individuals’ intrinsic incentives to act. People are intrinsically motiva-
ted when they undertake an activity for its own sake. The hidden cost
of reward has been observed, for instance, in asylums where paying
the patients to perform certain tasks (such as making the bed or clea-
ning their room) undermines their motivation to complete them when
they are not paid. An everyday example would be an invitation to a
friend’s home for dinner. Nobody would pay him for the effort because
this would destroy his intrinsic motivation (his friendship).
Two psychological processes account for the hidden cost of re-
ward :
(i) When individuals perceive the external intervention to be ‘con-
trolling’ in the sense of reducing the extent to which they can determine
actions by themselves, intrinsic motivation is substituted by extrinsic
control. The locus of control shifts from the inside to the outside of
the person affected. Individuals who are forced to behave in a specific
way by outside intervention, would feel ‘overjustified’ if they maintai-
ned their intrinsic motivation. They rationally reduce the motivational
factor under their control, their intrinsic motivation.
(ii) An intervention from the outside undermines the actor’s in-
trinsic motivation if it carries the notion that the actor’s intrinsic mo-
tivation is not acknowledged. The person affected feels that his or her
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competence is not appreciated which leads to an impaired self-esteem,
resulting in a reduced intrinsic motivation.
Based on these psychological processes, the hidden cost of reward
can be generalized in two respects :
(a) All outside interventions can affect intrinsic motivation : in ad-
dition to rewards the same effect can come about by external regula-
tions (commands);
(b) External interventions crowd-out intrinsic motivation if they
are perceived to be controlling and they crowd-in intrinsic motivation if
they are perceived to be supporting.
Crowding Theory is supported by a large number of experiments
undertaken by social psychologists (see Deci and Ryan, 1985; Lane,
1991). There have already been not less than five formal meta-analyti-
cal studies of laboratory experiments on crowding theory. The most
extensive and recent study by Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999) shows
that the crowding-out effect is indeed a robust phenomenon of signifi-
cant size under the specified conditions. There exists also convincing
evidence from real life situations. Frey and Jegen (2001) survey this
growing literature that shows the relevance of crowding out for such
issues as the siting of locally unwanted projects (the so-called ‘Not In
My Backyard’ or NIMBY-problem), work morale, volunteering or envi-
ronmental regulations.
Crowding Theory can be fruitfully applied to how constitutional
and other legal rules affect the individual citizens. This paper argues,
and empirically shows, that the institutional design systematically af-
fects the intrinsic motivation of the citizens : a constitution mistrusting
its citizens under identifiable constitutions leads to a crowding out ef-
fect, while a constitution acknowledging and supporting its citizens’
civic virtue has a positive crowding in effect.
A number of empirically observable conditions for the sign and
size of the crowding effect have been identified in the literature (Lane,
1991; Frey, 1997b). In the context of constitutional design, two condi-
tions prove to be the most important :
(1) The individual’s institutional participation possibilities. When
a person is simply subjected to a decision, she perceives the interfe-
rence to be controlling, and her intrinsic motivation for the respective
activity is crowded out. If, on the other hand, a person is able to take
part in a decision, her self-esteem is supported, and her intrinsic mo-
tivation is crowded in.
(2) The closer the interaction between the person or institution
administering the intervention and the person being subjected to it,
the more negative is the crowding effect. In particular, the stronger
the communication between the two sides, the more likely intrinsic
motivation is crowded out.
External interventions may moreover have an indirect damaging
effect on intrinsic motivation. The crowding out effect may spread to
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further areas, even into those where the external intervention has not
been applied. There may thus be an indirect‚ Motivation Transfer Effect
which has to be added to the direct crowding-out effect. The fact that
changes in intrinsic motivations (in the broadest sense) may be linked
across areas has been known as the ‘spread effect’ in psychology and
has also been noted by various economists, though they have not re-
lated it to crowding-out (e.g., Sugden, 1989, p. 93; Williamson, 1993,
p. 480). In the United States, for instance, strong correlations have
been identified between changes in voter participation, charitable con-
tributions and other forms of social cooperation attributing to declines
in intrinsic motivation (civic norms) in a multiple regression analysis
(Knack, 1992).
3 Do Trusting Constitutions Affect Civic
Virtues ?
Attempts to measure the effect of different constitutional conditions on
citizens’ civic virtue are necessarily faced with great difficulties and un-
certainties, and there is only partial evidence available. Most promising
are indirect approaches by looking at revealed behaviour. This method
has been used to measure tax morale as an important component of
civic duty. It has been well established that tax paying behaviour can-
not be explained in a satisfactory way without taking into account tax
morale. Thus, based on the American Internal Revenue Service’s Tax-
payer Compliance Maintenance Program, Graetz and Wilde (1985 : 358)
conclude that ‘the high compliance rate can only be explained either
by taxpayers’ (...) commitment to the responsibilities of citizenship and
respect for the law or lack of opportunity for tax evasion’. The same
authors (with Reinganum 1986) attribute the observed falling tax com-
pliance in the United States to the erosion of tax ethics1.
The extent of tax morale revealed by tax paying behaviour may
be shown to depend on the type of constitution existing (for an exten-
sive discussion of the evidence presented in this section see Pomme-
rehne and Frey 1993 and Frey 1997a). Switzerland presents a suitable
test case because the various cantons have different degrees of politi-
cal participation possibilities. It is hypothesized that the more exten-
ded political participation possibilities in the form of citizens’ meetings,
obligatory and optional referenda and initiatives are, and the broader
the respective competencies are, the higher is tax morale and (ceteris
paribus) tax compliance. On the basis of these characteristics, about
one third of the 26 Swiss cantons are classified as pure direct demo-
cracy (D), another third as pure representative democracies (R), and
1 Further evidence can be found, among others, in Schwartz and Orleans (1967), Lewis (1982),
Roth, Scholz and Little (1989), Pyle (1990), and Slemrod (1992).
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the rest satisfies only some of the characteristics. A cross section /
time series (for the years 1965, 1970, 1978, i.e. 78 observations) mul-
tiple regression explaining the part of income not declared Ynd, yields
the following results2 (t-values in parentheses) :
Ynd = 7.17−3.52p−2.42f +0.79
∗t−0.36∗d−2.72 ln(Y ) +0.57∗∗NY −1.09∗A−7.70∗∗D
(−1.98) (−0.62) (2.10) (−2.51) (−0.30) (2.98) (−2.53) (−3.80)
R2(adj.) = 0.69, d.f. = 41, F = 11.08
Ynd = 8.98−3.22p−2.32f +0.59t− (−0.42
∗∗)d+1.03 ln(Y ) + 0.60∗∗NY −0.82A+4.02∗R
(−1.72) (−0.36) (1.70) (−3.47) (0.29) (3.07) (−1.93) (2.23)
R2(adj.) = 0.65, d.f. = 41, F = 9.43
∗,∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 95% and 99% levels respectively.
The explanatory variables are :
p = probability of detection (the number of individual income tax audits per 1000
tax payers);
f = penalty tax rate;
t = mean marginal tax rate;
d = income deduction possibilities;
ln(Y ) = per capita income (in natural log.);
NY = non-wage income;
A = old-age taxpayers’ share (reflecting experience in tax matters).
The coefficients of the variables indicating the type of democracy
(D, R) – the other variables are used to control for other influences3 –
have the theoretically expected signs. In cantons with a high degree of
direct political control (D), tax morale is (cet. par.) higher. The part of in-
come concealed falls short of the mean of all cantons by 7.7 percentage
points, or in absolute terms the average amount of income concealed
is about SFr. 1, 600 (per taxpayer) less than the mean income concea-
led in all cantons. In contrast, in cantons with a low degree of political
control (R), tax morale is (cet. par.) lower. The part of concealed income
is four percentage points higher than the average income gap, and the
mean income undeclared exceeds the mean of all cantons by about
SFr. 1, 500. The estimation results are consistent with the hypothesis
that greater democratic participation possibilities lead to higher civic
virtue as reflected in tax payer behaviour (for corresponding evidence
for the United States see, e.g. Smith 1992, and Kinsey 1992).
2 Due to multicollinearity between D and R (r = 0.6) two separate equations including D and
R have been estimated.
3 It may be observed that while many coefficients are statistically highly significant and have
the theoretically expected signs, the probability of detection p and the size of the fine f
are not statistically significant at the conventional levels, i.e., it cannot be presumed that
deterrence works.
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The empirical evidence collected for Switzerland can be genera-
lized. In a broad sense, two kinds of democratic tax systems can be
distinguished : One is based on the premise that the citizens are res-
ponsible persons, and that in principle they are prepared to contribute
to the provision of public goods and the redistribution of income by the
state, provided this process is reasonably efficient and fair (see, e.g.
Smith 1992).The corresponding tax laws allow the citizens to declare
their own income and to make generalized deductions. The tax state-
ments are in principle accepted as trustworthy, and the tax authority
bears the burden of the proof if it doubts the declarations.
The second type of tax system starts from the assumption that
all citizens want to exploit the tax laws to the fullest, and cheat when-
ever they can. The corresponding tax laws deduct the taxes directly
from gross income, and the citizens are charged to claim back from the
government depending on the deductions the tax authorities grant. In
the whole process the burden of proof always lies with the individual
citizen.
The economic approach to taxation has centred on deterrence, fol-
lowing the influential article by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) based
on Becker’s theory of crime (1968). Recently, the perspective has chan-
ged. Thus Slemrod summarizes his authoritative book on Why People
Pay Taxes (1992, p. 7) by stating : ‚.. there .. is a change in perspective
away from deterring noncompliance toward positive encouragement for
compliance – and emphasis on the ‘carrot’ for compliance rather than
the ‘stick’ for noncompliance’.
The two basic types of tax systems can be empirically associated
with the general level of civic virtue and tax evasion in particular coun-
tries (Schmölders 1960, 1970, Strümpel 1969). A trusting tax system, a
correspondingly high tax morale and relatively low tax evasion exist in
the United States and Switzerland. Econometric research on taxation
has indeed revealed for these two countries that the citizens’ willing-
ness to pay taxes cannot be explained by an expected utility calculus
based on the probability of detection and magnitude of fine4. A distrus-
ting tax system obtains in countries such as the Federal Republic of
Germany, France and Italy where tax morale is low and tax evasion is
relatively large (Frey and Weck 1984).
On a more general level, there is a cumulative body of research
indicating that people’s perceptions of how they are treated by the au-
thorities strongly affect their evaluation of authorities and laws, and
4 The implied risk aversion to account for observed behaviour would be incredibly higher than
anywhere else empirically observed, see Skinner and Slemrod (1985) and Alm (1995) for
the United States, and Pommerehne and Frey (1993) for Switzerland. Hessing et al. (1988)
find that a quite small level of deterrence is enough to keep citizens from evading taxes.
Econometric tax research has at least so far not been able to identify a consistent, and
quantitatively significant negative influence of deterrence on tax evasion (see, e.g., Roth,
Scholz and Witte 1989, Cowell 1990, Slemrod 1992).
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their willingness to cooperate with them (e.g. Bardach and Kagan 1982,
Lind and Tyler 1988, Tyler and McGraw 1986). Citizens who consider
the constitution and its laws, and the authorities acting on their basis
to be fair and to treat them respectfully, tend to be more compliant than
those with more negative perceptions of government (e.g., Thibault and
Walker 1976, and for extensive empirical evidence see Tyler 1990). The
notion that people reciprocate trustworthy behaviour by the govern-
ment has been empirically confirmed by Kucher and Goette (1998) for
the case of voluntary income tax declaration in Switzerland. Kelman
(1992) shows that the extensive use of adversary institutions for re-
solving public conflicts (which are prevalent e.g., in the United States)
tends to negatively affect civic virtue, thereby appreciably raising tran-
saction cost in the areas concerned.
4 Trusting the Constitutional Approach :
Institutions and Happiness
‘Trusting constitutions’ has a second meaning. Constitutions can in
fact be trusted. In this section we argue that the constitutional ap-
proach to politics and society can provide insights in a comparatively
young field of research : happiness and economics. Evidence from Swit-
zerland shows that happiness and constitutional design are related. A
higher extent of direct political participation possibilities, or in other
words more strongly developed institutions of direct democracy (in par-
ticular via popular referenda and initiatives) raise citizens’ subjective
well-being.
The results or consequences of different constitutional designs
are difficult to measure empirically. In order to do so, a frame of refe-
rence is needed. Most political institutions tend to be stable over time,
so that a cross-sectional analysis is appropriate. However, it is difficult
to isolate the effects of particular institutions because the countries
usually differ in a great variety of aspects. Not all of them can be cap-
tured in a multiple regression analysis and unobserved characteristics
of countries may be systematically correlated with the output indicator.
In our case we want to assess the effect of direct democratic ins-
titutions on people’s reported well-being. A comprehensive compari-
son across countries is difficult because there are essentially only two
countries, Switzerland and the USA, where major decisions (for the
USA at least on the state level) are taken by the voters via initiatives
and compulsory or optional referenda. However, the difficulties can be
circumvented when the effects of institutional variation within a (fede-
ral) country are analyzed. This has been done in a number of studies
for the United States and Switzerland, where the extent of direct demo-
cratic rights differs between states and cantons. A systematic survey
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on this research is provided in the recent book of Kirchgaessner, Feld
and Savioz (1999). In the case of the United States, econometric studies
reveal that the more directly democratic states (ceteris paribus) have
lower total public expenditure, but tend to spend more on education.5
For Switzerland, econometric analyses suggest that (ceteris paribus)
the more extended direct democratic rights are in a canton, the lower
are the tax burden and public deficits, and the higher are per capita
incomes.6 As a whole, econometric research leads to the conclusion
that the preferences of the citizens are better observed in jurisdictions
with more direct participation rights. Moreover, favourable outcomes
should be reflected in higher individual utility.
Measures of subjective well-being can serve as proxies for “uti-
lity”. They are captured in surveys on individuals’ happiness or life
satisfaction.7 As people are generally supposed to be the best judges
of the overall quality of their life, it is a straightforward strategy to ask
them about their well-being. In a number of studies, the validity of
these answers has been documented. Happy people are e.g. more of-
ten smiling during social interactions (Fernández-Dols and Ruiz-Belda,
1995) and are rated as happy by friends and family members (Sand-
vik et al., 1993), as well as by spouses (Costa and McCrae, 1988). In
psychology, there is a long tradition of research applying well-being
measures (see the anthology by Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz, 1999
or the recent survey by Diener et al., 1999). In contrast, there is still a
widespread scepticism against studying survey data in economics. Ho-
wever, this is slowly changing now and a growing field of research on
happiness and economics exists. Most of the work on happiness and
economics tries to capture the influence of economic determinants on
subjective well-being, i.e. income, unemployment and inflation (see the
early work of Easterlin (1974) or e.g. Clark and Oswald (1994), Di Tella
et al. (2001), Frank (1997), Oswald (1997) and Winkelmann and Win-
kelmann (1998)). Also demographic factors have been investigated (see
e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald (2000)). Here the comparative institutio-
nal approach is applied to study the effect of constitutional design on
subjective well-being.
The empirical test for different extents of direct democratic parti-
cipation rights draws on Frey and Stutzer (2000).8 It is based on survey
results of more than 6000 Swiss residents, collected by Leu, Burri and
5 See. E.g. Matsusaka (1995) or Rueben (1999) for general government expenditure, or Santerre
(1989; 1993) for public education expenditures.
6 See e.g. Schneider and Pommerehne (1983) and Feld and Kirchga¨ssner (1999) for general
government expenditures. The latter authors also study the effect on self-financing ratios,
taxes, and debt. Feld and Savioz (1997) analyse the effect on per capita gross domestic
product.
7 “Subjective well-being” is used here interchangeably with the terms “happiness” and ”satis-
faction with life”.
8 The extent of direct democratic rights in Swiss cantons is measured by a slighty different
index than the one applied in the presented estimates on tax morale. The index used here
defines the degree of participation possibilities on a scale between one and six, compared to
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Priester. The question on life satisfaction was as follows : “How satis-
fied are you with your life as a whole these days ?”, with answers on
a scale of one (“completely dissatisfied”) to ten (“completely satisfied”).
The survey found a high general level of life satisfaction in Switzerland
with an average of 8.2 out of 10 points.9
Table 1 presents the estimated coefficients and marginal effects
of a microeconometric happiness functions, taking into account demo-
graphic and socio-economic determinants as well as the constitutional
variable direct democratic rights. A weighted ordered probit model is
used in order to exploit the ranking information contained in the origi-
nally scaled dependent variable. The weighting variable that is applied
allows representative results on the subject level for Switzerland.
The estimation results show statistically significant effects of se-
veral demographic and socio-economic factors, and, most importantly,
the constitutional factor on individual happiness. The results can be in-
terpreted as follows : A positive coefficient indicates that the probability
of stating happiness greater than or equal to any given level increases.
The marginal effect indicates the change in the share of persons be-
longing to a stated happiness level when the independent variable in-
creases by one unit.10 In the case of dummy variables, the marginal
effect is evaluated in regard to the reference group. For simplicity, only
the marginal effects for the extreme value of very high happiness (score
10) are shown in Table 1.
The estimation results show that constitutional differences affect
happiness. People are happier in cantons with more extended direct de-
mocratic participation rights, ceteris paribus. An increase in the index
of direct democratic rights by one point raises the number of persons
indicating the highest level of life satisfaction by 2.8 percentage points.
In addition, the effect itself is sizeable :
(i) The marginal effect of direct democratic rights on happiness is
as large as the effect of living in the second-bottom (SFr. 2, 000−3, 000)
instead of the bottom income category (< SFr. 2, 000).
(ii) The effect is even larger when the full range of the institutional
variable is considered, i.e. when individuals in canton Basel Land (with
the highest democracy index of 5.69) are compared to citizens in canton
Geneva (with the lowest direct participation rights of 1.75). The former
state with an 11 percentage points higher probability that they are
completely satisfied.
the three point scale considered before. A full account of how the index is constructed can
be found in Stutzer (1999).
9 The data were collected between 1992 and 1994 in order to investigate the problem of po-
verty in Switzerland. Information is from personal interviews and tax statistics. Additional
information includes demographic characteristics, employment status and income situation
of the household.
10 Alternatively, the marginal effect indicates the change of the probability belonging to a stated
happiness level when the independent variable increases by one unit.
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Table 1 : Constitutional Design and Subjective Well-Being
Dependent variable : satisfaction with life
Weighted ordered probit
Std. err. adjusted to clustering in 26 cantons
Variable Coefficient t-value Marginal effect
(score 10)
(1) Demographic factors
Age 30 - 39 −0.079 −0.865 −0.027
Age 40 - 49 −0.008 −0.106 −0.003
Age 50 - 59 −0.081 −1.275 −0.027
Age 60 - 69 0.206∗∗ 2.903 0.073
Age 70 - 79 0.295∗∗ 3.401 0.106
Age 80 and older 0.273∗∗ 2.968 0.099
Female 0.043 1.211 0.015
Foreigner −0.284∗∗ −5.048 −0.091
Middle education 0.113∗∗ 3.143 0.039
High education 0.119∗ 2.472 0.042
Single woman −0.258∗∗ −6.294 −0.083
Single man −0.174∗ −2.589 −0.057
Couple with children −0.068 −1.777 −0.023
Single parent −0.372∗∗ −3.602 −0.113
Other private household −0.128 −1.664 −0.042
Collective household −0.413∗∗ −3.432 −0.124
(2) Socio-economic factors
Self-employed 0.072 1.413 0.025
Housewife 0.123∗ 2.463 0.043
Unemployed −0.841∗∗ −5.814 −0.211
Other employment status −0.129(∗) −1.911 −0.044
Equivalence income SFr. 2, 000− 3, 000 0.084∗ 2.199 0.029
Equivalence income SFr. 3, 000− 4, 000 0.143∗∗ 3.169 0.050
Equivalence income SFr. 4, 000− 5, 000 0.258∗∗ 5.382 0.092
Equivalence income SFr. 5, 000 and more 0.192∗∗ 4.277 0.068
(3) Constitutional factor
Direct democratic rights 0.082∗∗ 3.054 0.028
Observations 6134
Prob > F 0.001
Notes : Level of satisfaction is on an eight point scale (scores of 1, 2 and 3 were aggre-
gated). White estimator for variance. In the reference group are ‘people younger
than 30’, ‘men’, ‘Swiss’, ‘people with low education’, ‘couples’, ‘employed people’
and ‘people with a lower equivalence income than Sfr. 2,000’. Additional control
variables (not shown) for size of community (5 variables) and type of commu-
nity (7 variables). Significance levels : (∗) 0.05 < p < 0.10, ∗ 0.01 < p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01.
Data source : Leu, Burri and Priester (1997).
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(iii) The improvement affects everybody, i.e. the institutional fac-
tor is important in an aggregate sense. In comparison, getting a job
‘only’ raises the subjective well-being of the unemployed.
The result that citizens are the happier the more extensive their
constitutional participation rights are, can be attributed to two fac-
tors. First, the institutions of popular referenda and intitiatives forces
the politicians to supply a public output which is closer to the pre-
ferences of the citizens. Second, the population positively values the
constitutional participation rights as such, i.e. they derive utility from
the possibility of being active in the political process.
In addition, the estimate in Table 1 shows that a number of de-
mographic and socio-economic factors taken into account in previous
happiness studies, exert a statistically significant and sizeable effect
on satisfaction with life : Compared to young respondents, people ol-
der than 60 are happier. People with higher education report signi-
ficantly higher subjective well-being. Compared to couples, people li-
ving in other family settings reach high satisfaction scores with a lower
probability. Unemployment reduces well-being dramatically; the pro-
bability of stating a satisfaction score of ten is 21.1 percentage points
lower for unemployed than for employed persons. Higher income cor-
relates with higher happiness in a statistically significant way. Howe-
ver, the differences in subjective well-being are rather small. Consider,
for example, the highest income group with a monthly equivalence in-
come11 above SFr. 5, 000. Compared to persons with low income, only a
6.8 percentage points larger share reports being ‘completely satisfied’.
5 Conclusions
‘Trusting Constitutions’ is important in two respects. Constitutions
that convey trust towards citizens have positive effects by fostering
civic virtue. In this respect, the extent to which the citizens are allo-
wed to actively participate in the political process is an important sign
of how much citizens are trusted. We present empirical evidence that
participation via popular referenda and initiatives leads to higher civic
virtue in the form of higher tax compliance. Trusting constitutions is
also worthwile because the constitutional approach provides valuable
insights to social and political issues. We show that different constitu-
tional designs systematically affect the subjective well-being of the citi-
zens. In particular, we present empirical evidence that more extensive
11 Equivalence income is measured by household income after taxes, social security expenditure,
interests on debts and maintenance is divided through the equivalence scale of the Swiss
Conference for Public Assistance. Four income groups are explicitly distinguished, ranging
from SFr. 2, 000 to SFr. 5, 000 and more. The constant term includes the reference group
which are people with an equivalence income lower than SFr. 2, 000.
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institutional participation rights ceteris paribus raise the happiness of
citizens because the political outcomes are closer to their preferences
and because they attribute a positive value to the possibility to directly
participate in the political process.
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Résumé
Cet article présente deux raisons de faire confiance aux constitutions :
premièrement, parce qu’elles encouragent et nourissent le sens civique
du devoir. Un point essentiel concerne alors le degré de participation
qui est accordé aux citoyens. Nous montrons empiriquement qu’une
participation croissante, par l’intermédiaire de référendum, augmente
le sens civique des citoyens, réduisant les fraudes fiscales. Deuxième-
ment, il faut faire confiance aux constitutions pour accroître le bonheur
des citoyens. Là encore, la participation joue un rôle central.
Abstract
Two explanations for the importance of trusting constitutions are offe-
red : First, constitutions that convey trust towards citizens have posi-
tive effects by fostering civic virtue. A crucial factor of a trusting con-
stitution is the extent to which the citizens are allowed to actively par-
ticipate in the political process. We present empirical evidence that
participation via popular referenda and initiatives can lead to higher
civic virtue in the form of tax compliance. Second, constitutions can
be trusted in the sense that the constitutional approach provides va-
luable insights to social and political problems. We show that different
constitutional designs affect one of the ultimate objecitves of life – the
happiness of the citizens.
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